Abstract. This paper analyses historical data since the mid-19th century to nd support for Wagner's Law in the Italian economy. Unlike previous studies, we accommodate possible nonlinear asymmetric eects of government spending and GDP toward their long-run equilibrium. The results reveal a threshold cointegrating relationship between the two variables with signicantly dierent error correction adjustments in normal and extreme regimes. A long-run tendency for the public sector to grow relative to GDP from 1862 to 2009 is observed only when nonlinearities generated by temporary higher military spending during wars are take into account.
Introduction
The provision of public goods and services to citizens using the central state's scal capacity implies that government expenditure underwent constant growth during the 20th century, despite institutional and cultural differences (Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) ). A simple explanation for the longrun determination of public spending was proposed by Wagner (1883) and is known as Wagner's Law (henceforth WL). WL states that a positive relation exists between level of economic development and scope of government. State expansion is driven by a growing demand for defence, public investment in infrastructures, education and wealth, but also for the regulation and enforceability of contracts which arises as a society becomes more complex.
These processes are not rigorously derived from a context of individual utility maximization. Some exceptions exist in WL literature. In a public choice framework, Meltzer and Richard (1981) , Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Lindert (1994 Lindert ( , 2004 propose an economic foundation for WL, in which WL emerges as a game between government and electorate. Governments tailor expenditure policies towards satisfying the median voter and this behaviour induces a relationship between public spending and national income. An alternative theoretical foundation of WL emerges as a Principal-Agent problem. As pointed out by Oxley (1994) , bureaucrats are rational utility maximisers that derive utility from power and prestige and expand the size of their bureaus at the expense of eciency. While the microeconomic foundations of WL are rarely discussed, a large number of studies focus on an empirical assessment of WL from dierent perspectives and applying dierent techniques. For recent overviews see Durevall and Henrekson (2011) , Kuckruck (2014) and Narayan et al. (2008, 2012) .
Generally speaking, an empirical strategy to investigate the relationship between public spending and economic growth involves the detection of causal links in a long-run perspective. Most examples in the literature start from an analysis of a bivariate error-correction regression model when a long-run relationship is observed between the variables of interest. Causality is then discussed applying a Granger bivariate causal structure. Such linear long-run relationships have been called into questioned in various ways. Only a few studies model structural breaks to evaluate shifts in the long-run; others test for positive or negative deviations from the trend in the short-run, implying asymmetric adjustment in the long-run (see Durevall and Henrekson (2011) ).
The present study aims to detect any endogenous nonlinearities within an analysis of the long-run relationship between the variables of interest. The specic purpose is to contribute to the analysis of WL within the Ital-ian economy based on historical time series from 1862 to 2009. Italy is an interesting case-study because it was a late-comer to industrialization that caught up in the late 19th century and then exhibited an excellent economic performance that enabled it to join the G7 group in the 1970s. This long time span is considered to be an appropriate framework for empirically assessing WL since it captures the evolution of government expenditure in response to the country's social and economic progress. Over such a long period, Italy underwent a number of economic and socio-political changes that represent potential sources for nonlinearities in the data including WWI and WWII, the Great Depression, and the socio-political turmoil of the post-war period. Such events might be the causes of dierent asymmetric responses in government spending to variations in national income. If this is the case, failure to take these data features into account could induce biased empirical results and misleading conclusion.
The main contributions of the paper are the following. Firstly, unlike previous studies, nonlinear cointegration is considered in order to analyse WL. The methodology of Hansen and Seo (2002) is applied to incorporate the possibility of threshold eects in the cointegrating relationship, nesting linear cointegration and allowing for the potential existence of one or more regimes. Secondly, support for WL in the Italian case over the period 1862-2009 can be identied only when the strong asymmetric responses of government spending during WWI and WWII are taken into consideration. Robustness checks recognize nonlinear behaviour of government spending driven by temporary higher military expenditure. Hence, the presence of asymmetric adjustments in the response of government spending may explain why the bulk of empirical evidence concerning WL is inconclusive. Finally, our paper also diers from existing studies of Italy because it relies on up-to-date series of national income and public spending provided on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of Italy's unication. The research department of the Bank of Italy, together with academics from other institutions, presented a reconstruction of new Italian national historical accounts, now in Bagi (2015) . These new series were the basis for the recently published Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy since Unication (Toniolo (2013) ), a volume including eighty-ve pages of quantitative data on the Italian economy since 1861. Italy's State General Accounting Department also published a special issue on total government expenditure and on its specic economic and functional items (actual payments in scal years) since Italy's political unication (RGS (2011)). Broadly speaking, our data dier from existing literature (e.g., Magazzino (2012) and Kuckruck (2014)) which uses either shorter time spans or not-revisited historical data or dierent public accounting methods (actual payments vs accrued expenses). Note that in the sequel, we intend to de-tail the dierences between the new series on national income and public spending and those used by recent papers testing WL for Italy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the empirical literature regarding WL. The econometric framework in relation to linear and nonlinear cointegration is described in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data in detail and comments on some stylized facts. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Robustness checks are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and oers suggestions for future research.
Wagner's Law
The long-run relationship between the size of the public sector and economic growth remains an important stylized fact accepted in the literature of public economics. Wagner (1883) oers a simple explanation for this: the growth of government expenditure is a consequence of the expansion of the state driven by a country's social and economic development. The urbanization and greater division of labour that accompany industrialization require, for example, more government regulation and higher expenditure on contractual enforcement and law and order. Other causes are the growing need to nance large-scale investments of benet to the general public (i.e. infrastructures) and the supposed superior income-elasticity of publicly provided goods and services, such as education, welfare, but also national security or defence.
In line with Wagner's conception of a developing society, North (1985, p.392) stresses the role of technological progress: "technological changes have led to an enormous increase in specialisation and division of labour, and therefore a radical change in relative prices which fundamentally altered the traditional structure of the polity, the family, and economic organisation. The variety of interest groups that emerged from this expanded division of labour led to political pluralism. The demand for new institutional forms of organisation to replace functions previously undertaken by the family and traditional economic organisation could not be completely realized by voluntary organisations because of moral hazard, adverse selection, and the demand for public goods".
Most of the empirical literature focuses on developed or developing economies over relatively short time spans, generally starting from the 1960s. The majority compare the results for industrialized and emerging economies in order to conrm the relationship between level of development and WL, although there are signicant dierences between a modern state in the 19th century and recent developing economies, in terms of culture, institutions and the conception of the state's role.
By contrast, the analysis of WL in a long-run perspective, for a single country or countries with similar social, economic and political conditions has attracted much less attention. Few studies analyse very long time spans and generally reject WL. Henrekson (1993) and Bohl (1996) In order to test WL, the literature assumes dierent functional forms linking public spending and national income. The present paper applies the following specication
where g is the logarithm of total government expenditure in nominal terms as a share of nominal GDP, and y is the logarithm of real per capita GDP. The above formulation is probably the most common in the literature and the majority of other models are simple reformulations of it (see Durevall and Henrekson (2011) ). Contrary to the alternative specication that considers total government expenditure and GDP, it has the advantage, by using real per capita GDP, of better assessing a nation's prosperity and the spending capacity of its citizens. Moreover, the use in Equation (1) of total government expenditure as a share of GDP instead of real total government expenditure allows for the possibility that dierences in productivity growth in government and private sector production lead to an increase in government spending due to "Baumol's disease" 1 . Equation (1) models the evolution of the demand for public goods and services in the long-run through the coecient θ which according to WL should be greater than zero. In this case, government expenditure increases faster than GDP, i.e., government expenditure is income-elastic, or in other words, it is a superior good. Cointegration and Granger causation oer an econometric framework to estimate Equation (1) . WL requires that if a longrun relationship exists, i.e. y and g are cointegrated, y must also Grangercause g and not viceversa. In this case, GDP evolution contains additional information about the long run determination of government spending, and not viceversa (i.e. GDP is weakly exogenous).
It should be noted that, while a strict interpretation of Wagner's statement indicates a positive correlation between government expenditure and GDP, this does not imply a strong causality between one variable and the other. The idea is that economic development is associated with an increased role of the government, but Wagner does not provide an articulated model of a growth process in which cause and eect are clearly delineated (on this point, see Peacock and Scott (2000)). Although this view of WL is compatible with weak exogeneity of GDP, the empirical literature widely uses the Granger causation test to derive causal macroeconomic implication for the relationship between the two variables. These policy implications are outlined in Magazzino (2012) where four types of causation are considered: Wagnerian causation (i.e. GDP Granger causes public spending), Keynesian causation (i.e. public spending Granger causes GDP), feedback (bi-direction causality) and neutrality (no causality exists).
In the subsequent paper we will refer to the concept of Granger causation as weak exogeneity, providing evidence that WL holds when y contains relevant information to understand the evolution of g and not viceversa.
Linear and Threshold Cointegration
To examine the relationship between government spending and growth, the usual research strategy starts from a vector error-correction model (VECM) in a bivariate framework. Let x t be a p-dimensional I(1) time series which is cointegrated with one p × 1 cointegrating vector β, with T observations and maximum lag length. A linear VECM of order + 1 can be expressed in compact form as
. . .
where w t (β) = β x t denotes the I(0) error correction term. The regressor
The error u t is assumed to be a vector martingale dierence sequence with nite covariance matrix Σ = E(u t u t ). In our case, with the previous notation, the vector of interest will be x t = (g t y t ) with p = 2 and one cointegrating vector. One element of β can be set equal to unity to achieve identication. Therefore, the second row of A coincides with the vector containing speed of adjustment coecients and w t (β) with the cointegrating relationship described in (1) . The error correction model oers a test of causality in terms of weak exogenity of the dependent variable. If two variables are cointegrated, at least one error correction term is expected to be signicantly non-zero (see, for instance, Islam (2001) for an application).
However, while previous studies have massively employed cointegration analysis, only some have adequately addressed the issue of regime change and, generally speaking, of any asymmetric shifts in the relationship between the variables. As government spending peaks may occur only above certain levels of economic activity, the use of threshold cointegration could be potentially more meaningful to capture the underlying dynamics of the data (see Chevallier (2011) or Subervie (2011) for other applications). In a threshold model, one set of dynamics often describes the usual state of the world, while another set describes the behaviour in less usual periods. Hence threshold cointegration extends the linear case by allowing adjustment to occur after deviation exceeds some critical level. So, while a linear VECM model assumes a constant adjustment rate towards a long-run equilibrium, a threshold cointegration approach instead assumes that error correction occurs depending on the threshold.
The approach adopted here was developed by Hansen and Seo (2002) , with a two-regime threshold VECM model proposed as a convenient method to combine nonlinearity and cointegration. The threshold VECM of order + 1 extends the model (2)-(3) taking the form
where γ is the threshold parameter and the coecient matrices A 1 and A 2 govern the dynamics in the two regimes. The threshold eect has content if
where π 0 > 0 is a trimming parameter, which is set as 0. 
whereβ is the null estimate of β, the search region [γ L , γ U ] is set so that γ L is the π 0 percentile ofw t−1 and γ U is the (1 − π 0 ) percentile. This imposes constraint (5). The statistics are computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimates. However, the SupLM statistic has a nonstandard asymptotic distribution. As discussed in Hansen and Seo (2002) , the xed regressor bootstrap of Hansen (1996 Hansen ( , 2000 can be used to calculate asymptotic critical values and p-values together with the residual bootstrap technique. This framework seems to be the most suitable to consider potential nonlinear eects in the long-run relationship between our variables of interest if the testing procedure described above produces evidence for this. . Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the ratio of total government expenditure to GDP compared to real per capita GDP on the full sample 7 . It shows that between 1862 and the mid-1890s, total government spending and real per-capita GDP followed very similar trends. During this period the investments in railways were particularly signicant and spending on education and culture also increased constantly from Unication to WWI. In the rst fty years following Unication, Italy's total government spending in real terms increased slowly, on average. Between 1862 and 1913 total gov- 4 From 1884 to 1964 Italy's scal year ran from July 1st to June 30th. The data were attributed to solar years by adding half of the expenditures disbursed in two consecutive scal years and assuming an equidistribution of expenditure over each scal year. 5 Even though the GDP series runs until 2013, our nal sample stops in 2009 given that the General Accounting Department does not provide an updated database with the same aggregation criteria as the RGS publication (2011). However, we are condent that four additional observations would not aect the results. 6 Note that these series were heavily awed by Cohen and Federico (2001) so that the Bank of Italy launched a project for the through reconstruction of the national accounts on which we rely. ernment spending was around 10% of GDP, but participation in WWI led to a drastic increase in total government spending to 35% of GDP. In the years following the conict, government spending dropped again sharply, in 1926 settling to the pre-war values compared to the GDP: defence spending dropped, while investments in public works and other economic interventions resumed. Participation in WWII led to an another drastic increase in government spending, from just over 10% to more than 45% of GDP. After defeat in WWII, Italy was prohibited from reconstructing its own independent military forces. This led to a drastic reduction in defence spending, as can been seen in Figure 2 . On the other hand, the economic and social components of expenditure started to increase: infrastructures, welfare, and redistribution by the state. Pressure from the extension of surage (universal surage was introduced in 1946) and an unprecedented wave of social conicts from the end of the 1960s, led to a progressive expansion of welfare services to new social categories in Italy until a universal welfare system was introduced in 1978. Moreover, Italy's pro-American stance during the Cold War and the possibility that the Italian Communist Party (the largest Communist party in the Western world) might organise a revolution meant that a large proportion of government expenditure was allocated to national security. In the 1970s this expenditure was further increased to counter political terrorism. Thus, between the end of WWII and 1963 public spending remained well below 25% of GDP while from the mid-1970s state spending began to grow more rapidly than the GDP, reaching a peak of 44% in 1986 (see Figure 1 ). During recent years the level of expenditure has been more stable. Between 1980 and 2009 total government expenditure actually declined in proportion to GDP. Starting from 1993, with a view to Italy's joining the single European currency, the imbalance in the national accounts began to be countered and clear results seen in 1995, achieving decisive progress in 1997, when the decit fell. A preliminary analysis of the series suggests a long-run relationship between total government spending and national income with some wide deviations during WWI and WWII. This supports our idea of taking into account any large but transitory deviations in the general long-run development of the variables.
Empirical Results
In this Section we explore the data available. First, some preliminary investigations are conducted on the (linear and threshold) stationarity of the series and the existence of a cointegrating relationship. After testing nonlinear cointegration, the model is estimated with description of the empirical results. 
5a. Preliminary Analysis
The stationarity of the two series of interest were investigated by applying alternative unit root tests. The rst test is the standard augmented DickeyFuller test which considers a null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of stationarity. The second is the modication of the above test proposed by Elliott (1999) . The last is the KPSS test proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) for the null hypothesis of stationarity versus the alternative of nonstationarity. The results are reported in Table 1 . Both tests suggest that government expenditure and real per capita GDP are realizations of I (1) processes.
However, it is known that standard unit root tests have almost no power when the alternative is nonlinear (Basci and Caner (2005) ). Therefore, further tests are conducted that allow for the joint consideration of nonlinearity (threshold) and nonstationarity (unit roots). The Caner and Hansen (2001) test was applied (for a short description, see Chevallier (2011)). If the null hypothesis H 0 holds, the series is nonstationary with a classical unit root. The alternative can be stated in two versions: a rst H 1 with a stationary threshold autoregressive pattern and a second H 2 with partially stationary threshold process. The test statistics are a one-sided Wald R 1T in the rst case and t-ratios t 1 and t 2 in the second case. Limit distributions and critical values are tabulated in Table 3 from Caner and Hansen (2001) . Even though the unit root tests have an asymptotic bound distribution, benet is achieved with a bootstrap procedure in nite sample. garding the R 1T statistics, the one-sided Wald test (unit root vs threshold stationary model) is rejected at 5% level only for the government expenditure series, suggesting a classical unit root for the real GDP series. Moreover, for government expenditure the individual t 1 and t 2 ratios suggest rejection only for the second regime. Hence, it can be concluded that government expenditure follows a partially stationary threshold process while real GDP contains a unit root in the classical sense.
In the following analysis the rst dierence of both series is considered, and preliminary summary statistics are given in Table 3 . Normality tests reject the null of normality in the data, and this could be partially due to temporal dependence in the moments of the series or to the presence of nonlinearities in the data. Before proceeding with the analysis, a search was conducted for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the two variables of interest. Note that, as a preliminary condition for cointegration, it was checked that the two time series are integrated by the same order (I(1)). Next, the linear Johansen cointegration rank tests were implemented (Johansen (1988) ), using 2 lags in the VAR, as suggested by the BIC criterion, and including an unrestricted constant. As shown in Table 4 , these preliminary tests easily reject the null hypothesis of no-cointegration, indicating the presence of one cointegrating relation. Therefore, the linear VECM was estimated and the results are shown in Table 5 . Here the estimates indicate bidirectionality in the two variables with no evidence of WL for this country. However, this could be due to a misspecication of the model due to threshold-type nonlinearities present in the data, as shown by previous tests. Hence, threshold cointegration techniques are applied in the following.
5b. Threshold Cointegration
Firstly, the presence of threshold eect under the null hypothesis of linear cointegration is explicitly tested for the complete bivariate specication. The xed regressor bootstrap and residual bootstrap methods were used, and both were simulated using 5,000 bootstrap replications. A lag length of = 1 in Equation (3) was selected, based on AIC and BIC criteria. Table 6 reports the test results for the linear versus nonlinear cointegration hypothesis, together with threshold and cointegrating parameter estimates. The resulting LM statistic computed as a function of the threshold parameter estimate γ is plotted in Figure 3 . The xed regressor bootstrap method rejects the null at 5% condence level and the residual bootstrap method at 1%. Thus, the threshold cointegration model seems more appropriate for our data than a linear model. In fact, ignoring asymmetric adjustment may lead to biased inferences and misleading conclusions. Hence the error correction mechanism diers depending on deviations from equilibrium below or above the threshold parameter. The rst regime (say, "normal") corresponds to g t−1 − 0.501y t−1 ≤ −5.532 while the second regime (say, "extreme") corresponds to g t−1 − 0.501y t−1 > −5.532. We also observe that 87% of all the observations belong to the rst regime and the remaining 13% to the second regime. Estimation is performed by MLE following the grid-search algorithm proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002) over an 80 × 80 grid of the parameters β and γ. Table 7 reports estimated threshold VECM values and the following results. The rst is that during "normal" periods lagged values of real per capita GDP signicantly inuence the dynamic behaviour of the Italian economy, while in the "extreme" regime government expenditure during the previous period tends to matter most. The second result concerns the coecients of the error-correction term w t−1 in the two regimes. This term suggests causality (at the level of weak exogeneity) running from economic growth to government activity: the negative and statistically signicant adjustment parameters in both government equations are evidence that WL holds. In this sense the GDP contains relevant information to predict the long-run path of government spending but not viceversa. Also the magnitude of the response of government expenditure is between 9 ("normal" regime) and 5 ("extreme" regime) times greater than the coecient in the GDP equation. The diagnostics reported at the bottom of Table 7 reinforce the evidence for nonlinearity given that the null of equality of the dynamic coecients as well as equality of coecients in the error-correction term are strongly rejected. Finally, the estimated long-run elasticity between government expenditure and national income is signicantly greater than zero (p-value=0.009) suggesting that government expenditure is income elastic, i.e. a superior good, over the entire sample.
To allow visual interpretation of these results, the error correction mecha-nism is illustrated in Figure 4 . It can be noted that the strong error-correction eect for the two variables is depicted on the right-hand side of the estimated threshold. On the contrary, it shows a at near-zero eect for real per capita GDP and a slightly greater eect for government expenditure on the left-hand side. Asymmetry shows a stronger error-correction eect in the "extreme" regime compared to the "normal" regime due to the government spending series. Furthermore, the timing of the regime shift was investigated. The estimated regime classication according to the threshold VECM is visually presented in Figure 5 . Our estimated model suggests that the economy happened to be in the "extreme" regime between 1915-1919 (with some follow-up in [1921] [1922] [1923] and between 1934-1945. These facts are in line with the preliminary assessment in Figure 2 , highlighting a drastic increase in military spending during these time spans associated with wars. Hence, the source of disequilibrium in the "extreme" regime must be ascribed to large transitory increases in defence spending, not necessarily induced by large variations in income. This generates an abnormal adjustment of government spending to return to the long-run equilibrium 8 . On the contrary, during "normal" periods, variations in public spending generally derive from changes in national income.
In conclusion, when these asymmetric adjustments are taken into account, all these results support WL for the Italian economy from 1862 to 2009.
Robustness
Two checks were conducted to conrm the accuracy of our results. Firstly, the linearity of WL for public spending was veried when the "extreme" periods are excluded from the data. Secondly, the linearity of this relationship was tested subtracting military spending from the total expenditure series.
Specically, the linearity versus nonlinearity LM test was run for the two remaining subsamples after exclusion of periods that induce nonlinearity. Applying the xed regressor and residual bootstrap to the subsample 1862 -1914 (1946 -2009 , respectively) generated p-values of 0.39 and 0.054 (0.092 and 0.052, respectively), which do not reject the null hypothesis of linearity at a 5% signicance level.
Since the model specically addresses wars, public spending on defence was subtracted from total government expenditure to remove the source of nonlinearity in the data. A new variable was dened as the natural logarithm of the ratio between total government expenditure minus national defence expenditure over nominal GDP. The linearity LM test was run again for the bivariate model and the p-values from the xed regressor and residual bootstrap were 0.26 and 0.105, respectively. This means that the linearity hypothesis at a 10% signicance level is not rejected, specically indicating military spending as a driving force for government expenditure. This evidence reinforces the conclusion outlined in Section 5. Hence, the source of nonlinearities is large but transitory and it is simply due to abnormal national defence spending.
Conclusion
This paper tests the long-run tendency for Italian total government expenditure to grow relative to per capita GDP over the period 1862-2009. Evidence was found for a threshold cointegrating relationship between these variables, which turns out to be consistent with WL, given the dierent adjustment speeds to the long-run path. Asymmetric error-correction eects identify two dierent regimes and the WWI and WWII periods perfectly match one of them. The abnormal response of government spending in this "extreme" regime was due to temporary increases in defence spending during the wars. This implies a hyper-adjustment of total government spending to return to the long-run equilibrium. On the basis of these results, we conclude that the model for public spending is basically linear and consistent with an expanding government sector as the economy progresses and the nonlinearities are transitory.
The above result suggests that the Italian governments invested constantly in public expenditure from 1862 to 2009. This may have served to strengthen the Italian state in the face of potential external and internal threats (i.e. the World Wars, the Cold War and socio-political turmoil in the post-war period) and in response to the growing demand of society for public services. However, this might not have been the most eective way to prompt economic growth, in particular if the composition of government expenditure shifted towards less productive spending, in terms of innovation and economic growth. For example, social spending on health and pensions increased enormously in response to social disruption and the demands of the electorate during the 1960s and 1970s becoming very high compared to spending on education and scientic research. As a result, despite the growth of Italy's human capital over the past thirty years, in terms of both secondary and tertiary education the country has not managed to close the long-standing gap separating it from the other OECD economies (Tanzi et al. (2000) , Visco (2014) ). Consequently, Italian governments could manage investments to stimulate long-term growth in this area. For example, the creation of a national innovation system and substantial investments in schools and universities could play a key role towards improving the quality of human capital.
For future research the following issues might be addressed. Firstly, in the context of nonlinear models, other forms of nonlinearity could be explored, like for example (and as kindly suggested by a referee) a quadratic eect in the relationship between public expenditure and growth. Secondly, it would be useful to study the nonlinear role of dierent items of public spending in economic growth, i.e. welfare. Finally, it would be worthwhile investigating the role of military spending from a comparative international perspective based on reliable historical data.
